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Reporting Rules for U.S. and International Lawyers 
Under Sarbanes-Oxley: Exporting an Unfinished 
Product? 
Lorella Nerini Dal Pezzo∗
I. INTRODUCTION
By imposing on counsel “up-the-ladder”1 reporting of corporate mis-
conduct, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX)2 has undertaken to deli-
neate the relationship of lawyers to their corporate clients as a function of 
corporate policing rather than as traditional counseling, advocating, or ad-
vising.  In the private sector, even after the recent revisions, the American 
Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC) R. 
1.13(b) leaves to the corporate attorney the resolution of the ethical quan-
dary regarding disclosure of known misconduct or violations of fiduciary 
duty up the corporate ladder: corporate counsel’s decision should be guided 
by the organization’s best interest and should be based on counsel’s reason-
able belief.3 Section 307 of SOX and related Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) rules, on the other hand, at least for public corporations, 
resolved the uncertainty: based on “credible evidence” of “material viola-
tions” of securities laws, when there is a breach of fiduciary duty or other 
* 2007 J.D. at Florida International University (FIU), member of the FIU College of Law’s Law 
Review, holds a Master in Business Administration & Certificate in International Business from FIU, 
and a Doctorate in Jurisprudence from the University of Bologna (Italy). Member of the Florida Bar and 
the Bologna Bar. Many thanks are extended to Professors Jerry W. Markham and Matthew C. Mirow for 
their patience and support with this project.  Also, thanks are extended to Law Librarian Marisol Floren 
for her untiring assistance. 
1
 Senator Edwards’ vernacular, short for the expression “up the corporate ladder” which refers to 
the chain of responsibility and command in corporations and other business enterprises, commonly used 
in most cited sources discussing SOX. 
2
 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 
28 and 29 U.S.C.A). 
3
 Roger C. Cramton, Enron and the Corporate Lawyer: A Primer on Legal and Ethical Issues, in 
ENRON CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS, 571, 583-84 (Foundation Press, 2004). After the 
2003 revisions, ABA Rule 1.13 incorporates the SOX approach, albeit in permissive terms. See A.B.A
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (b) (2005) (“Unless the lawyer reasonably believes that it is 
not necessary … the lawyer shall refer the matter to higher authority in the organization.”). 
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violation, the duty to report up within the organization is clear.4  Even 
though up-the-ladder reporting per se “does not break any new ground”5
and has been considered an appropriate response by corporate counsel, the 
SEC and the courts,6 and the MRPC before and after the 2003 revisions,7
the new rule, which makes up-the-ladder reporting a federal mandate for 
corporate internal and external counsel, creates an abundance of tensions 
and challenges going to the very core of the attorney-client relationship, 
some of which are reviewed in Section II.   
SOX is a response to a United States (U.S.) problem of corporate go-
vernance and accountability, but its global implications did not escape do-
mestic and international commentators and practitioners. Since 1,300 for-
eign corporations list securities on U.S. exchanges,8 a heated debate over 
the meaning of SOX provisions and the effect of their controversial, yet 
seemingly contemplated extraterritorial application ensued.  After touching 
upon the extraterritorial reach of SOX, Section III examines the peculiar 
uncertainties and interpretive considerations involved in deciphering and 
complying with the federal reporting rules for the foreign lawyer.  This Sec-
tion next examines how the reporting provision may affect foreign lawyers 
in light of fundamental differences in general principles of law, specific 
foreign legislation, conflicting professional responsibility rules, corporate 
structure and governance, and the role of corporate lawyers within it.  Last-
ly, this section reviews different approaches foreign countries have adopted 
to transition to systems of corporate governance directed at containing the 
4
 Cramton, supra note 3, at 585; 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2002); 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b) (2003) (stating 
that “the attorney shall report … forthwith”); Id. § 205.2(e) (defining evidence of material violation to 
mean “credible evidence based upon which it would be unreasonable under the circumstances, for a 
prudent and competent attorney not to conclude that it is reasonably likely that a material violation has 
occurred, is ongoing or is about to occur”); Id. § 202.2(d) (defining breach of fiduciary duty broadly as a 
breach arising under federal, state statute, or at common law).   
5
 Peter J. Henning, White Collar Criminal Law in Comparative Perspective: The Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002: Sarbanes-Oxley Act 307 and Corporate Counsel: Who Better to Prevent Corporate Crime,
8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 323, 340 (2004). 
6
 See S.E.C. v. Nat’l Student Marketing Corp., 457 F.Supp.682 (D.D.C. 1978) (denying the 
injunction and relying on the corporate bar to make sure that their conduct comports with the law, but 
stating that the attorney’s silence was breach of his duty to speak and lent the appearance of legitimacy 
to the transaction); In Re Carter and Johnson, 22 S.E.C Docket 292, WL 384414 (1981) (finding that 
lawyers were used as a shield to protect against the pressures of the banks to get disclosure, which 
amounts to a perversion of the lawyer-client relationship, and that no lawyer may continue in such a 
situation to recommend disclosure when he knows the recommendations are not being heeded). 
7
 Before the 2003 revisions, A.B.A MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 did not clearly 
establish an up-the-ladder reporting mandate as a way to deal with “known” misconduct by officers, 
employees or other people associated with the organization, stating only that the attorney “shall proceed 
as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization.” A.B.A. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.13 (b) (2001). The Rule then suggested that, in deciding how to proceed, the attorney 
consider the seriousness and consequences of the violation, the scope of representation, the responsibili-
ty and the motivation of the person, the policies of the organization, among other factors. Id.    
8
 Cramton, supra note 3, at 585. 
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underlying causes of the corporate scandals that have plagued most of the 
industrialized world, with a view to the role reserved to the corporate law-
yer in the process.   
Section IV, after exploring the propriety of charging the corporate 
lawyer—and even more so, the foreign corporate lawyer—with corporate 
policing duties, attempts to create a vademecum for the foreign corporate 
lawyer to steer clear of inadvertently trampling over SOX-created addition-
al responsibilities with respect to reporting and vigilance of potential corpo-
rate wrongdoing.   
In conclusion, although refining and clarifying lawyers’ responsibili-
ties and duties in corporate settings may be desirable and even necessary, it 
should not be regarded as a preventative remedy against future corporate 
fiascos.  Deputizing corporate lawyers as watchdogs on behalf of a federal 
agency with prosecutorial authority may be appealing as a wake up call to 
the profession, particularly when a few of its formerly respected members 
fell asleep at the switch.  On the other hand, lightly pondered federalization 
of the rules of professional conduct erodes not only client confidentiality 
and the foundation of the attorney–client relationship, but even more dra-
matically, shakes the foundation of the adversarial system by reconfiguring 
the balance of power between government and individual in favor of the 
government, a structural flaw not addressed by the SEC rules. A norm that 
creates multiple tensions and uncertainties for the domestic bar, while not 
demonstrably improving transparency of corporate governance or improv-
ing the opportunities to detect or prevent corporate misconduct, is not fit for 
export and should not be exported.  At this point, short of creating excep-
tions for the foreign bar altogether, instead of retreating from the quagmire 
of SOX blanket applicability with SEC rules that still leave areas of confu-
sion and uncertainty, it might be prudent to recast the federal professional 
responsibility rule in permissive terms, and consider it an aspirational 
norm—at least until tested with the domestic bar.  
II. FEDERAL DEPUTIZATION: A DILEMMA FOR U.S. CORPORATE ATTORNEYS 
SOX up-the-ladder reporting rules were ostensibly created to increase 
public accountability and transparency, and to improve corporate gover-
nance.
9
  They, however, impose on corporate counsel for corporations listed 
with the SEC an inquisitorial, if not prosecutorial, role they are likely not 
trained for and most definitively not placed on corporate payroll for, either 
9
 See Roger C. Cramton, George M. Cohen & Susan P. Koniak, Symposium, Up the Ladder and 
Beyond: The New Professional Standards for Lawyers Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Legal and Ethical 
Duties of Lawyers After Sarbanes-Oxley, 49 VILL. L. REV. 725, 728 (2004).  
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as internal or external counsel.10   The SOX up-the-ladder reporting re-
quirement (especially in its originally proposed form, including the “noisy 
withdrawal” later placed in abeyance), as part of the SOX’s concerted effort 
to restore investors’ confidence in the market, reflects the presumably wide-
spread belief, to the extent that the expression of Congressional will can be 
taken as a reflection of the beliefs of the constituency, that lawyers were, to 
some extent, responsible for the recent spate of scandals.11  Although the 
primary targets of the federal intervention to improve corporate governance 
were accountants and corporate officers, lawyers were included under the 
facially, not far-fetched assumption that the elaborate frauds that were per-
petrated in the Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, Healthsouth, and other all too fam-
ous headline-grabbing financial disasters, could not have occurred without 
the lawyers’ active help or at least their acquiescence.12
In an ever more complex corporate world, lawyers have increasingly 
become an integral part of corporate decision-making and strategic plan-
ning in the business world, as opposed to serving only in the development 
of the purely legal aspects of individual transactions.13 Considering this 
trend, it is not surprising that Congress, while regulating executives and 
accountants, took an interest in defining the position, responsibility, and 
professional duties of a player whose importance in the corporate context is 
increasing and evolving.  On the other hand, reacting to the unprecedented 
threat to the integrity of capital markets, the federal government intervened 
to a heretofore unthinkable extent in regulating attorneys’ professional re-
sponsibility in the business context, imposing on lawyers general watchdog 
duties not only regarding securities violations but also “other violations” or 
“breaches of fiduciary duty.”14
This Section highlights the traditional characteristics of the lawyer-
client relationship as they apply to the client-corporation.  The Section then 
examines the rules introduced by SOX that affect the practice of corporate 
lawyers, with particular attention to Section 307 and related SEC Rules.  
Further, this Section draws a comparison with MRPC, identifying conflicts 
between the overlapping application of SEC rules and the MRPC.  Finally, 
the analysis identifies a sea-change in the role of the lawyer through the 
10
 Jason Thompson, The Paradoxical Nature of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as it Relates to the Practi-
tioner Representing a Multinational Corporation, 15 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 265, 269 (2006)(stating 
that the SEC enlisted domestic and foreign attorneys to resolve the practical difficulty of investigating 
whether companies are observing proper practices); see also Henning, supra note 5. 
11
 Simon M. Lorne, An Issue-Annotated Version of the SOX Rules for Lawyer Conduct, 1464 
PRAC. L. INST. 393, 402 (2005). 
12
 Id.
13
 See Henning, supra note 5, at 360 (noting that lawyers are a fact of life, especially in publicly 
traded corporations, that they become involved in most steps during business decisions providing advice 
in multiple areas of law). 
14
 15 U.S.C. 7245(1) (2002). 
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federalization of professional responsibility standards. This change threat-
ens the independence of the profession, and compromises the integrity of 
the adversarial system.  At the same time, this sweeping change does little 
to correct the conditions that allowed corporate governance failures, while 
it produces several undesired and unintended consequences of its own.   
A. Lawyers in the Corporate World 
Lawyers work on behalf of their clients as employees, agents, or inde-
pendent contractors. Like other professionals, lawyers bring to the relation-
ship special expertise which leads clients to defer to their professional 
judgment and to follow their recommendations.15 However, unlike other 
professionals, lawyers have legal authority to make certain legal decisions, 
and the clout to pressure clients into accepting their advice, especially with 
respect to illegal or potentially illegal conduct.16  SOX has expanded the 
ability of lawyers, at least those “appearing and practicing” before the SEC, 
to persuade, force, or even override their clients by giving them power not 
only to withdraw, but to reveal confidential information—a more direct tool 
to persuade clients to act within the the law or to correct illegal action, at 
least in public corporate settings.17
1. Confidentiality and Attorney-Client Privilege 
Tensions between opposing values are not a new theme in the profes-
sional responsibility of corporate lawyers.  The MRPC attempts to strike a 
balance between the competing values of protecting clients and protecting 
society. “A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation 
of a client unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is im-
pliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation or the disclosure 
is permitted” under specific circumstances.18 At the outset, the rules of pro-
fessional conduct recognize that confidentiality is at the basis of the attor-
ney-client relationship, and endeavor to provide a framework for communi-
cation between lawyer and client based on trust and candor to allow the 
advocate to obtain accurate and complete information, and to enable him to 
provide competent assistance to resolve legal problems.19  Since the lawyer 
is duty-bound not to reveal information “relating to the representation” the 
client is “encouraged to seek legal assistance and to communicate with him 
fully and frankly even as to embarrassing or legally damaging subject mat-
15
 Fred C. Zacharias, Coercing Clients: Can Lawyer Gatekeeper Rules Work? 47 B.C. L. REV.
455, 456 (2006). 
16
 Id.
17
 Id. at 458.  
18
 A.B.A. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2005). 
19
 See id.; Id. R. 1.6 cmt. 2; Id. R. 1.13; Id. R. 1.13; Id. R. 2.1; Id. R. 1.1; Id. R. 1.3. 
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ter.”20 The lawyer needs this information to provide effective representation 
and to give legal advice, including advice to refrain from wrongful conduct 
when necessary.21  The client will not be able to express himself candidly if 
he is in fear that his advocate may turn against him.22 One scholar has com-
pellingly, albeit critically, observed that confidentiality is treated by the bar 
as a constitutional norm alongside with loyalty.23
There is, however, a tension between the client’s need for confidential-
ity and society’s need for transparency and accountability. Confidentiality is 
reinforced by the evidentiary tool of the attorney-client privilege recognized 
by the Supreme Court as a fundamental tenet of representation and promot-
ing the “public interests in the observance of the law and the administration 
of justice.”24 Society’s need for transparency and accountability is reflected 
in the exceptions to both the duty of confidentiality and the evidentiary pro-
tection of the attorney-client privilege which allow, or even mandate in spe-
cific circumstances, disclosure of otherwise confidential information.25  As 
will be further discussed below, this tension has been addressed by the 
MRPC by means of a solution admittedly shrouded in ambiguity.  However, 
this ambiguity is not exclusively due to the reluctance of the profession, but 
also is due to the recognition that a bright-line policing solution may irre-
parably compromise the partisan role of the advocate, while demanding of 
the lawyer the superhuman task of contemporaneously serving two masters 
with opposing interests in an adversarial system, and then offer one’s repu-
tation to the easy attack of hindsight bias.26
The importance of maintaining confidentiality, loyalty to the client, 
and the proper role of the lawyer in an adversarial system is not a legal pro-
fession concept that receives widespread appreciation by the uninitiated in 
general, much less in the corporate context; therefore, if SOX is to be taken, 
in a somewhat simplified view, as the expression of popular will, it is no 
surprise that its enactment may have given short shrift to these aspects of 
20
 Id. R. 1.6 cmt. 2. 
21
 Kaveh Noorishad, Current Development 2004-2005: The Sarbanes Oxley Act and In-House 
Legal Counsel: Suggestions for Viable Compliance, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1041, 1042 (Summer 
2005).  
22
 See Fisher v. U.S., 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (stating that the purpose of the lawyer-client 
privilege is to encourage clients’ full disclosure to their lawyer, recognizing that “[a]s a practical matter, 
if the client knows that damaging information could more readily be obtained from the attorney follow-
ing disclosure than from himself in the absence of disclosure, the client would be reluctant to confide in 
his lawyer and it would be difficult to obtain fully informed legal advice.”).  
23
 Susan P. Koniak, When the Hurlyburly’s Done: The Bar’s Struggle with the SEC, 103 COLUM.
L. REV. 1236, 1244 (2003) (criticizing the fact that confidentiality shapes the interpretation of other 
norms of lawyer’s conduct and noting that state law requires that ethics rules be subordinate to state law, 
not the other way around). 
24
 Upjohn Co. v. U.S., 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). 
25
 A.B.A. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2005). 
26
 Cramton, supra note 3, at 587. 
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the profession, especially when some voices from its very ranks were airing 
the same concerns.27 As will be further discussed below, client confidentiali-
ty is re-defined in the context of listed companies by up-the-ladder report-
ing rules, and by the whistleblower provision.     
2. Confidentiality and the Corporation 
It is important to define who the client is in the corporate context, 
since in a situation of confidentiality, the attorney-client privilege belongs 
to the client.  Is it the Board of Directors, management, the shareholders, or 
the corporation?  In Upjohn v. United States, the Supreme Court noted this 
dilemma, rejected the control group test, which would afford protection 
only to information flowing between top executives and corporate attor-
neys, and indicated that the applicability of the attorney-client privilege 
should be decided on a case-by-case basis.28 The Court held that the privi-
lege could apply to communication by both middle and lower level em-
ployees, arguably extending the protection of the privilege with respect to 
lawyer-client communication in corporations, since the corporation is an 
artificial creature of the law.29  The MRPC takes a similar approach by 
clearly identifying the organization as the client, and stating that communi-
cation with employees or other “constituents” in their organizational capaci-
ty is confidential.30
Similarly, § 205.3(a) specifies that attorneys representing issuers owe 
their duty to the issuer, meaning the organization, not to the officers or em-
ployees that the attorney normally works or interacts with.31  However, 
based on the SEC Rules, confidentiality is apparently redefined by implica-
tion to apply only to the information which lies outside of the mandatory 
up-the-ladder reporting.32  A paradoxical situation is thus created: the issuer, 
through its management, determines the scope of representation; all lawyer-
client interactions are perforce with the individual executives, managers or 
employees, as the representatives of the corporation.  In this setting at least, 
27
 Lorne, supra note 11, at 403. The proposal for Federal regulation of lawyers was instigated by 
law professors. Id.; see, e.g. Koniak, supra note 23 (describing her contribution to the proposal by 
Senator Edwards and charging that the bar legal vision of what the law is “functions in the day to day 
life of a substantial segment of the bar to nullify state law.”).  
28
 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389-90. 
29
 Id.  However, Upjohn is not consistently followed in state courts.  See Alexander C. Black, 
Annotation, What Corporate Communications are Entitled to Attorney-Client Privilege-Modern Cases,
27 A.L.R. 5th 76 (1995).  
30
 See A.B.A. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (a) (2005); Id. R. 1.13 cmt. 2 (specify-
ing that the constituents of the organization are not ipso facto the lawyer’s clients, and that the lawyer 
may not disclose to them information relating to the representation of the organization except as ex-
pressly or impliedly authorized to carry out the representation or otherwise permitted by the rules). 
31
 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(a) (2003).  
32
 See id. §205.3(b)(1) (clarifying that the act of up the ladder reporting does not constitute re-
vealing clients confidences or secrets or otherwise protected information). 
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the sacrosanct confidentiality norm is reduced to little more than an empty 
shell.  While the line of demarcation between the corporation and senior 
management may seem clear, in practice it blurs.33 Indeed, it blurs even as it 
relates to in-house counsel and senior management, against whom the at-
torney is expected to turn in, carrying out his duty to report up-the-ladder 
the very group or individual who most likely hired him, to whom he may 
report daily, and from whom he receives his compensation check.34 The 
question, therefore, is how many attorneys are willing to risk their jobs or 
lose face with the Board based on the belief, even though founded on credi-
ble evidence and satisfying a reasonable likelihood standard (as further ex-
plored below), that a violation has been committed, or even less concretely, 
may be about to be committed?35 In practice, the first time the in-house at-
torney or the outside attorney report up the corporate ladder is likely to be 
the last.36 Conversely,, in the context of the corporation, up-the-ladder re-
porting is considered to be completely consistent with client confidentially 
in that it appraises the decision-makers of the need to take internal correc-
tive action.37
3. Corporate Lawyer-Counselor 
The corporate lawyer is not merely a transaction engineer,38 but retains 
his role of advisor as expressed in MRPC R. 2.1.39  The lawyer “shall exer-
cise independent professional judgment and render candid advice. In ren-
dering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law, but to other considera-
tions such as moral, economic, social and political factors that may be rele-
vant to the client’s situation.”40 The attorney is therefore urged to provide 
the client more than the narrow legal terms,41 to offer perspective on the 
implication of a course of conduct, to help the client clarify his objectives 
by weighing the short term advantages against the long term costs of a pro-
posed course of action.42 In his role as advisor, the lawyer is expected to 
offer straightforward legal advice even when it goes against what the client 
33
 Noorishad, supra note 21, at 1045.  
34
 Id.
35
 Id.   
36
 Id. at 1051.  
37
 Timothy P. Glynn, Symposium, Federal Privileges in the 21st Century: One Privilege to Rule 
them All? Some Post Sarbanes-Oxley and Other Reflections on a Federally Codified Attorney-Client 
Privilege, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 597, 611-12 (2004) (opining that even noisy withdrawal would not 
discourage candor promoted by attorney-client privilege and would not significantly expand existing 
withdrawal obligations).  
38
 Thomas G. Bost, Corporate Lawyers After the Big Quake: The Conceptual Fault Line in the 
Professional Duty of Confidentiality, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1089, 1137 (2006). 
39
 A.B.A. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2005). 
40
 Id.
41
 See id. R. 2.1 cmt. 2. 
42
 Bost, supra note 38.  
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wants to hear.43  Giving legal advice perforce engages a moral discourse, 
since ethical and moral considerations are always involved in discussing 
rights, duties, and the consequences of one’s conduct vis-à-vis third par-
ties.44   In a somewhat idealized and slightly anachronistic picture of the 
attorney-client relationship, they each depend and rely on one another for 
honesty and candor to develop, in conjunction, the right solution, not only 
in terms of being prudent and wise in the specific situation, but also in the 
sense of being morally and ethically correct.45  Even in less than ideal situa-
tions, in exercising the function of counselor, the lawyer most likely will 
and should engage in moral discourse, which presumes a system of values 
and beliefs, to a large extent shared by lawyer and client, that the lawyer 
can draw upon to steer the client in the morally correct direction.   
Many agree that, whether the lawyers were victims, bystanders or 
knowing agents, at the center of the corporate scandals that spurred the fed-
eral professional responsibility intervention, there was a general failure of 
moral compass.46  The question is whether it is even plausible to posit that 
the Federal rules can succeed by fiat, where the existing rules have arguably 
not measured up, in the mission of ultimately changing the behavior of cor-
porations to conform to the federal ideal of corporate morality using law-
yers as their roving investigation and enforcement tools.   
4. SOX for Lawyers: Up-the-Ladder Reporting 
Several provisions of SOX may affect lawyers in corporate settings. 
For example, Section 303 makes it unlawful “for any officer or director of 
an issuer, or any other person acting under the direction thereof, to take any 
action to fraudulently . . . mislead any independent public or certified ac-
countant . . . for the purpose of rendering such financial statements mate-
rially misleading.”47 Another provision of SOX affecting lawyers is Section 
806, which provides whistle-blower protection for fraud-related communi-
43
 A.B.A. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 cmt. 1 (2005) (specifying that the attorney 
“should not be deterred from giving candid advice by the prospect that ..[it] will be unpalatable to the 
client.”). 
44
 Id. R. 2.1 cmt. 2 (“It is proper for a lawyer to refer to moral and ethical considerations in giving 
advice.”). 
45
 Bost, supra note 38, at 1138. For a skeptical perspective on the relationship between lawyer 
and client in practice, see Cramton, Cohen & Koniak, supra note 9, at 815 (noting that the notions of 
trust and candor in the lawyer-client relationship is surrounded by a great deal of romanticism while 
studies reveal mistrust and suspicion where clients are unwilling to reveal sensitive and embarrassing 
facts). 
46 Bost, supra note 38 at 1139. 
47
 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, §303 (2002). 
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cation by an employee of a public corporation, which presumably applies 
also to those employees who are lawyers. 48
However, Section 307, the provision specifically directed at the corpo-
rate bar, has generated the biggest reaction by the profession.  Section 307 
directs the SEC to set minimum standards of professional conduct for attor-
neys representing issuers before it.49  It requires attorneys to report evidence 
of material violations of securities law, breaches of fiduciary duty, and simi-
lar violations to the Chief Legal Officer (CLO) or to the Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) of the issuer, and to report to the audit committee if the CLO 
or the CEO fails to respond.50  Section 307 and SEC Rule 205 place attor-
neys “appearing and practicing” in front of the SEC “in representation of an 
issuer” within the purview of the SEC’s own rules of professional conduct.51
An attorney is considered to be “appearing and practicing” before the SEC 
when he transacts any business with the SEC; represents an issuer in an 
administrative proceeding or in connection with any SEC investigation, 
inquiry, information request, or subpoena; or gives advice on securities laws 
or Commission rules on any document, information or statement he knows 
will be filed with the SEC.52
Attorneys who engage in the conducts indicated outside the context of 
providing legal services to an issuer with whom they have an attorney-
client relationship, and “non-appearing” foreign attorneys are exempted.53
Commentators have concluded that the provision has a broad reach cover-
ing inside and outside counsel, both domestic and foreign.54  Attorneys serv-
ing in legal departments (even those working in a non-public subsidiary of a 
48
 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, §806 (2002) (stating that “no public company . . . may 
discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or in any other manner discriminate against an employee 
in the terms and conditions of employment because of any lawful act done by the employee (1) to pro-
vide information, cause information to be provided, or otherwise assist in the investigation  which the 
employee reasonably believes constitutes a violation of . . . any provision of Federal law relating to 
fraud against shareholders, when the information or assistance is provided to or the investigation is 
conducted by (A) a Federal, regulatory or law enforcement agency; (B) any member of Congress or any 
Committee of Congress; or (C) a person with supervisory authority over the employee or such other 
person working for the employer who has the authority to investigate, discover or terminate misconduct; 
or (2) to file, cause to be filed, testify, participate in , or otherwise assist in a proceeding filed or about to 
be filed (with any knowledge of the employer) relating to an alleged violation . . . .” ). 
49
 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2002).  
50
 Id.
51
 See 17 C.F.R. § 205.1 (2003) (indicating that the standards supplement existing applicable 
standards of professional conduct where the attorney practices, and do not limit the ability of any juris-
diction to impose additional obligations—albeit in conformity with the rules—but specifying that 
“[w]here the standards of a state or other United States jurisdiction . . . conflict with this part, this part 
shall govern.”). 
52
 See id. § 205.2(a)(1). 
53
 Id. § 205.2(a)(2)(i) and (ii) (2002); Id. § 205.2(j) (defining foreign attorneys).   
54
 J. Curtis Greene, Note, New Regulations for Lawyers: The SEC Final Rule for Professional 
Conduct in the Wake of Sarbanes Oxley: Challenges for Foreign Attorneys, 14 IND. INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 807, 829 (2004).   
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public company) of an issuer or providing legal services in the context of an 
attorney-client relationship are included in the purview of the rules, but 
attorneys employed by a public company in a non-legal capacity are not.55
It is noteworthy that an attorney-client relationship can be found even 
though there is no retainer or agreement for the provision of legal services.56
However, employees of an issuer who, even though they may be licensed 
attorneys, are not engaged as such but employed in different capacities, 
such as compliance officer, business development executive, or employee 
benefit administrator, are not subject to the rules.57
The attorney who becomes aware of credible evidence of a material 
violation,58 defined as a violation of “applicable United States Federal or 
state securities law, a material breach of fiduciary duty arising under United 
States Federal or state law or a similar violation of United States Federal or 
state law” committed by an officer, director or employee of the issuer, is 
required to report such evidence to the issuer CLO or CEO.59 A violation of 
foreign law does not constitute a material violation under the Act.60 Evi-
dence includes only credible evidence based upon which it would be unrea-
sonable, under the circumstances, “for a prudent and competent attorney not 
to conclude that it is reasonably likely that a material violation has oc-
curred, is ongoing, or is about to occur.”61  The determination of whether 
there is sufficient evidence to support a finding that a material violation has 
occurred or is about to occur is fact sensitive, involving the attorney’s skills, 
background, previous contacts and experience with the particular client, the 
time limitations under which he is working, and the availability of addition-
al counsel for consultation.62 Therefore, mandatory reporting up the corpo-
rate ladder, as indicated by the expression “reasonably likely,” is triggered 
only when the attorney, in weighing the evidence available to him, con-
cludes that it is more likely than not that a violation has occurred, is occur-
ring, or is about to occur.63 The trigger to instigate reporting within the 
ranks of the client corporation, and to encourage consideration of the con-
duct thus identified within the organization is relatively low.64 The rules 
indicate that, in performing “up-the-ladder reporting,” the attorney “does 
not reveal client confidences or secrets or privileged or otherwise protected 
55
 Id.
56
 Id.   
57
 Stanley Keller, SEC’s Attorney Professional Conduct Rules, THE PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO 
THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT, Vol. 2, Section III 1, 3 (2004). 
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 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2002). 
59
 17 C.F.R § 205.3(b)(1) (2003); Id. § 205.2(i). 
60
 Keller, supra note 57, at 5. 
61
 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(e) (2003); Keller, supra note 57, at 5.  
62
 Greene, supra note 54, at 836. 
63
 Id.   
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 Keller, supra note 57, at 5. 
472 FIU Law Review [3:461
information related to the attorney’s representation of an issuer.”65 Once 
subject to the rules, it is not necessary that the information be obtained in 
connection to the representation or that the information relates to the repre-
sentation, for the duty to report to be triggered, but time-wise, the duty to 
report is likely to be considered at an end when the representation ends.66
Reporting to the CLO, in turn, triggers an obligation on her part to 
make a reasonable inquiry into the evidence to determine whether a viola-
tion is occurring, has occurred, or is about to occur.67  The CLO must then 
report back to the attorney if she concludes in the negative, or cause the 
issuer to take all reasonable steps to adopt an “appropriate response,” in-
cluding remedial measures or sanctions to stop or prevent the violation, if 
she concludes in the positive.68 Last, the CLO must advise the reporting 
attorney of the issuer’s response.69 If the CLO fails to provide an appropri-
ate response to the reported violation within a reasonable time, the attorney 
is required to report up-the-ladder to the issuer audit committee or other 
committee of independent directors or to the full Board of Directors 
(BOD).70 The attorney could also bypass the CLO and go directly above her 
if he believes that it would be futile to report below.71
Once he receives an appropriate and timely response to his report, the 
attorney is in compliance with the reporting requirements of the rule.72  If he 
is not satisfied with the response received from the CLO, the attorney must 
explain his reasons.73 The debate is open as to the meaning of appropriate 
response, even though the rules provide some guidance.74 The debate is 
likewise open regarding what constitutes reasonable time for the response 
to be provided,75 as well as what exactly is the obligation of the attorney 
65
 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(1) (2003). 
66
 Keller, supra note 57, at 5. 
67
 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(2) (2003). 
68
 Id.
69
 Id. (the rule makes the CLO responsible to adopt all appropriate steps to cause the issuer to 
undertake an appropriate response). 
70
 Id. § 205.3(b)(4).  
71
 Id. (bypassing reporting under §205(b)(1), the report to the CLO and CFO, and mandating 
reporting by the attorney directly to the BOD audit committee, or if the issuer does not have an audit 
committee, directly to the BOD).  
72
 Id. § 205.3(b)(8) (the attorney who receives an appropriate and timely response “need do 
nothing more . . .  with respect to his or her report”). 
73
 Id. § 205.3(b)(9) (the attorney who is not satisfied with the response must explain his reasons 
for dissatisfaction to the CLO, CEO or Board of Directors). 
74
 See id. § 205.2(b); See Keller, supra note 57, at 7 (stating that appropriate response, one of the 
most difficult concepts, should cause the attorney to form the reasonable belief that (i) no material 
violation has occurred, is ongoing or about to occur; (ii) the issuer has taken appropriate remedial meas-
ure, or (iii) the issuer has directed an attorney to review the evidence the evidence  and has substantially 
implemented recommendations made, or has advised the attorney that a colorable defense can be as-
serted.  The attorney’s determination as to whether the response was in fact appropriate has to be rea-
sonable in light of the circumstances.).   
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 See 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(3) (2003). 
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who is not satisfied after he has reached the end of the ladder for internal 
reporting, besides the mere explanation of his reasons indicated by the 
rules.76 In practical terms, after reporting, the lawyer may not face this thor-
ny dilemma, as he is likely to have been eliminated from the issuer’s pay-
roll or any retainer agreement may come to an abrupt end.  
In addition, as under MRPC, the attorney is allowed to reveal without 
the consent of the client corporation confidential information relating to the 
representation, to the extent that he believes it is necessary, in three in-
stances: 
1) in connection with an investigation or with litigation where the at-
torney’s compliance with the rules is at issue (referred to as the “self 
defense” disclosure); or 
2) to the SEC, where the attorney reasonably believes disclosure 
would prevent the client from committing a material violation likely to 
cause substantial injury to the financial interests or property of the is-
suer or investors or an illegal act; or 
3) to rectify the consequences of a material violation to further 
which the attorney’s services were used.77
5. ABA Rules and State Rules 
The ABA MRPC that the states use as guidance for their own rules of 
professional conduct, even after the recent changes, adopts a fundamentally 
different approach to the issue of client confidentiality and the attorney’s 
duty regarding client confidences.  As noted above,78 a fundamental prin-
ciple in the attorney-client relationship is that the lawyer must not reveal 
information relating to the representation unless the client gives informed 
consent.79  Even when the MRPC recognizes situations where confidentiali-
ty may have to be breached, most of the time the choice is left to the lawyer.   
Most provisions, such as the crime-fraud exception, center on permis-
siveness. “A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation to 
the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary . . . to prevent the client 
from committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to result in sub-
stantial injury to the financial interests or property of another . . . .” 80  In 
addition, pursuant to MRPC R. 1.2,  
76
 After the originally proposed “noisy withdrawal” was not adopted, and reporting to the SEC or 
others is worded permissively.  See id. § 205.3(b)(9) and (10) (whistleblower protection provision). 
77
 Id. § 205.3(d)(1)-(2). 
78
 See Keller supra note 57 at Section II. A.1. 
79
 A.B.A. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (2005). 
80
 Id. R. 1.6 (b)(2). 
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“[a] lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client in 
conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer 
may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct 
with the client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith 
effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the 
law.”81
However, a lawyer does not become party to a criminal or fraudulent 
course of action solely based on the fact that a client may use his advice to 
further her criminal purposes.  The MRPC recognizes the critical difference 
between providing legal analysis of a proposed conduct and providing the 
means by which it can be committed with impunity.82
On the other hand, the rules provide more definitive guidance for the 
lawyer when he discovers the client is engaged in ongoing fraudulent or 
criminal activity. The lawyer “shall withdraw” if “representation will result 
in violation of the rules of professional conduct or other law.”83 However, 
the lawyer “may withdraw” for good cause, some examples of which in-
clude situations where the client persists in a course of conduct “involving 
the lawyer’s services that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or 
fraudulent;”84 or where  “the client has used the lawyer’s services that the 
lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent.”85 Notably, the law-
yer’s mandatory withdrawal duty is only triggered in extreme cases, for 
example, if the client demands that the attorney engage in illegal or unethi-
cal conduct,86 a situation that, although possible, is likely to rarely present 
itself so blatantly. The permissiveness standard of MRPC R. 1.16(b) pro-
vides that the option to withdraw is only available if it can be accomplished 
without “material adverse effect” to the client.87
Also applicable is MRPC R. 1.13 which, in the context of the organi-
zational client relationship, establishes that, if the lawyer knows that an 
officer or employee is engaged in illegal action, he shall proceed in the best 
interest of the organization.88  The rule was modified after SOX to harmon-
ize with federal requirements, or to restate the federal requirement in terms 
conforming to the general regulatory framework of the MRPC.  Here, the 
obligation of up-the-ladder reporting, although established in positive see-
mingly mandatory terms, leaves it up to the lawyer to determine whether it 
is necessary to do so, and whether it is in the best interest of the organiza-
81
 Id. R. 1.2 (d). 
82
 Id. R. 1.2 cmt. 9.  
83
 Id. R. 1.16 (a)(1). 
84
 Id. R. 1.16 (b)(2).  
85 A.B.A. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (b)(3). 
86
 Id. R. 1.16 cmt. 2. 
87
 Id. R. 1.16 cmt. 7. 
88
 Id. R. 1.13 (b) (the lawyer “shall report” unless he reasonably believes it not necessary). 
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tion.89 Likewise, the choice of whether the lawyer should report out infor-
mation relating to the representation, when the highest authority in the or-
ganization insists upon a course of action that is clearly in violation of the 
law and reasonably certain to cause substantial injury to the organization, is 
left with the attorney if and to the extent that he believes it necessary.90
The ABA rules in this area have been criticized as lacking substance 
and not being adequately enforced.91 Conversely, after the 2003 revisions, 
they have also been criticized for eroding the foundation of attorney-client 
confidentiality by expanding the exceptions to its protective advocacy co-
coon, and by forcing the lawyer to take into account with heightened 
awareness the financial interests of third parties in deciding whether to re-
port client confidences.92
The MRPC is adopted by each state only to the extent that the rules are 
found persuasive.  Even after SOX and the 2003 MRPC revisions, to date 
there is substantial diversity among the rules adopted by the states on the 
importance of confidentiality, reflecting different judgments as to the proper 
balance to be maintained between the trust-inducing confidentiality rules, 
and the obligations of lawyers to third parties reflected in an almost even 
split between jurisdictions that mandate or permit disclosure, and jurisdic-
tions that prohibit it.93
6. Uneasy Coexistence of Federal and State Professional Conduct  
Rules 
When SOX was enacted, the domestic bar was outraged by the federal 
intervention in a traditionally state regulated subject matter.94  There was 
concern about the creation of additional conflicting standards governing 
lawyers inherent in the intervention of a different regulatory body. There 
was the sentiment that, with respect to regulating lawyers, SOX opened a 
Pandora’s box. There was preoccupation with overlapping norms emanating 
from federal and state levels. There were misgivings over inviting trespass-
ers into the traditional domain of the ABA.95 Indeed, Section 307 and re-
lated SEC rules delineate norms of conduct piece-meal, with little regard to 
how the rules integrate with a body of law, that has been evolving and refin-
ing for decades, tending towards a basis of national uniformity, while al-
lowing the states to experiment and express their judgment regarding how 
89
 See id. R. 1.13 (b). 
90
 Id. R. 1.13 (c) (1)-(2). 
91
 Greene, supra note 54, at 820-22.   
92
 Bost, supra note 38, at 1140-42. 
93
 Id. at 1125-26.  
94
 See Henning, supra note 5, at 345. 
95
 Chi Soo Kim & Elisabeth Lafitte, The Potential Effects of SEC Regulation of Attorney Conduct 
Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 707, 708-09 (2003). 
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the local bar should conduct itself vis-à-vis their clients, and in general, as 
professionals in the law.  
However, with the SEC final rules, some of the outrage subsided be-
cause the rules—at least on their face, pending authoritative interpretation 
by the Division of Enforcement—have mediated some of the most trouble-
some issues raised by the federal intervention.  First, by defining a new 
category, the “attorney appearing and practicing” before the SEC, the rules 
have arguably limited their reach to those members of the bar who satisfy 
those requirements, and subjected only that subset of attorneys to their pur-
view.96 Some commentators have gone so far as characterizing the rules, 
after the “fall” of the “noisy withdrawal” or “dirty withdrawal” as “substan-
tially inoffensive.”97 Second, the lamented inconsistencies between state 
rules and federal rules, although most certainly not eliminated, especially in 
light of the inter-jurisdictional variations mentioned above,98 have been 
lessened by conflict resolution provisions that, at least with regards to dis-
cipline and sanctions or other liability under state rules of professional con-
duct, exempt the “appearing and practicing” lawyer from the impossible 
task of following conflicting mandates between the SEC and his state bar.99
Third, the same conflict as it pertains to foreign attorneys has been resolved 
in the opposite manner, i.e. by exempting foreign attorneys from following 
SEC rules when prohibited by applicable foreign law.100
However, on the negative side, unlike state bar rules of professional 
responsibility, mainly because the SEC rules are federal and their enforce-
ment is not likely to mirror their state counterparts, some commentators 
have predicted that they are likely to have their principal effect, not by in-
fluencing the behavior of lawyers, but by creating the principles under 
which the appearing and practicing lawyers will be subjected to SEC sanc-
tions.101  In other words, the main thrust of the federal rules would be nega-
tive rather than positive and constructive, and premised, not on the facts as 
understood or anticipated by the lawyer, but as they later unravel,102 inevita-
bly giving in to hindsight bias.  In addition, according to some, the SEC 
96
 17 C.F.R. § 205.1 and 205.2 (2003). 
97
 Lorne, supra note 11. However, the fall of the noisy withdrawal rule could be a premature 
conclusion, since reportedly the SEC is taking a wait and see approach on its introduction. Id.; see Sue 
Reisinger, Securities Law: At the Revolution, CORPORATE COUNSEL Vol. 6 Issue 03 (March 2006) avail-
able at http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1140689110891 (last visited Mar. 25, 2008). 
98
 See supra Section II.A.5.   
99
 See 17 C.F.R. § 205.6(c) (2003) (compliance in good faith to the SEC rules shall not subject the 
attorney to discipline under inconsistent rules of the state bar where he is admitted to practice).   
100
 Id. § 205.6(d). 
101
 Lorne, supra note 11.  
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rules in their definitional precision would exceed the scope permitted by 
SOX.103
Furthermore, areas of direct conflict between MRPC and SEC rules 
still persist, and not on minor points.  For example, while MRPC R. 1.6 
states that the attorney shall not reveal any information pertaining to client 
representation without prior client permission, derogating only in the case 
of the crime fraud exception,104 the SOX up-the-ladder reporting rules re-
quire just the opposite, establishing that up-the-ladder reporting does not 
constitute violation of clients’ confidences.105  Of course, the SEC rules give 
a way out to the “appearing and practicing” attorneys and support com-
pliance with SOX by establishing that compliance can be used as a defense 
in case the attorney is reported to the disciplinary board of the state where 
he practices.106 The reporting attorney, therefore, most likely violates the 
rules of ethics he vowed to uphold as the price to pay for not violating the 
SEC rules where the penalties are extremely severe.107
Indeed, the non-complying “appearing and practicing” attorney is sub-
ject to civil penalties as well as SEC remedies available under securities 
laws, including civil injunction, monetary penalties, and cease and desist 
orders.108  Attorneys are also subject to discipline and potential suspension 
under the SEC rules of practice, but not to criminal liability for the violation 
of the duty to report.109  The professional responsibility rules subject the 
individual attorney to liability, but should not subject his firm to liability; 
however, the SEC could sanction the law firm or the company that employs 
the lawyer on other bases.110 In fact, a willful violation of SOX, or any rules 
enacted under it, is punishable with maximum prison sentences of twenty 
years and maximum fines of $5 million for a natural person, and up to $25 
million for a business.111
B. Is Mandatory Up-the-Ladder Reporting the Solution?
Many experts, after a critical analysis of the Enron debacle, believe 
that it would be fallacious to expect that that a set of rules would be suffi-
cient to correct the underlying causes of financial disasters resting on an 
103
 Id. at 399. 
104
 Thompson, supra note 10, at 268; MRPC R. 1.6 limits the disclosure “to the extent that the 
lawyer reasonably believes it is necessary to prevent a client from committing a criminal act that the 
lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm.” A.B.A MODEL RULES 
OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2005). 
105
 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(1) (2003).  
106
 Thompson, supra note 10; 17 C.F.R. § 205.6(c) (2003).  
107
 Thompson, supra note 10, at 268-69.  
108
 Keller, supra note 57, at 11. 
109
 Id.
110
 Id.
111
 Thompson, supra note 10; 15 U.S.C. § 78j-o, 7210 (2002).  
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entrenched culture of cavalier practices and corporate incentives that en-
courage or permit deception and fraud.112  Commentators have posited that 
it is likely the new rules will not have a meaningful impact on the behavior 
of corporate lawyers.113  For example, Jeffrey Garten, Dean of the Yale 
School of Management, has warned against the creation of an audit mentali-
ty based on the illusion that enough rules, and literal compliance with them, 
will make up for structural deficiencies in corporate governance.114 Many 
have suggested that, instead of federal rules, a starting point to reassess the 
role of the lawyer in corporate governance should be to do away with con-
ditions endemic to the corporate world, such as personal competitiveness or 
the premium placed on expediency and flexibility that, although not unethi-
cal per se, may compromise the basis for independent professional judg-
ment of counsel.115 But the interventions needed to bring about these types 
of shifts may be daunting, expensive, operate on the long term, and are not 
as immediately visible as a set of federal rules.   
Noting that lawyers normally try to stay away from fraud, alternative 
explanations of the corporate debacles have been proposed that take the 
focus away from the lawyer’s professional practice, allegedly at the service 
of schemes to defraud investors, positing that some members of the bar may 
be as susceptible as sophisticated investors, analysts, and other employees 
to be fooled by skilled perpetrators.116 “Perpetrators of large scale fraud 
succeed because they are good at it.”117 Inevitably, when the fraud is unco-
vered, investigation will reveal signals that, in hindsight, may appear so 
clear  that they should have been identified earlier on,118 especially, so the 
reasoning goes, by the lawyer who is charged with knowledge of the differ-
ence between legal and illegal conduct.   
Others have welcomed the coherent set of coordinated reforms he-
ralded by SOX and followed by Sentencing Guidelines and by amendments 
to the MRPC. All share a similar approach, that of relying on lawyers as the 
eyes and ears of government to monitor corporate malfeasance and to create 
112
 Contra, William H. Simon, Wrongs of Ignorance and Ambiguity: Lawyer Responsibility for 
Collective Misconduct, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 35 (2005) (concluding that the rules “undercut the attrac-
tiveness of deliberate ignorance and calculated ambiguity” and continue the trend of increasing legal 
pressures towards “duties of inquiry and articulation” exemplified by the federal courts imposition of 
criminal liability in situations of “conscious avoidance”). 
113
 Lorne, supra note 11, at 400. 
114
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FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS, 625, 641 (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004).  
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(2004) (positing that “the problem of lawyer complicity, active or passive, in managerial wrongdoing 
may be rooted in a socially determined moral obtuseness shared by too many corporate managers and 
corporate lawyers” so deeply embedded in the social context that rules may affect it only marginally). 
116
 Lorne, supra note 11, at 401.   
117
 Id.
118
 Id.
2008] Reporting Rules for U.S. and International Lawyers 479
a more transparent, ethical corporate environment to restore the confidence 
of the investing marketplace.119 Some consider promising the fact that the 
reforms enlist the insiders of the organization, who are the repositories of 
information, and use stiff penalties to help them overcome the gut wrench-
ing moral and social challenges involved in turning in friends. At the same 
time, these reforms elevate corporate wrongdoing to the top of prosecutorial 
agendas, sensitizing the public and potentially, in the long run, bringing 
about a change in norms of behavior in the business world.120
Other commentators have characterized the provisions addressed spe-
cifically to the lawyers as largely aspirational.121 Even though the quest to 
enlist the support of corporate attorneys to help the cause of preventing 
corporate crime may have been admirable in its purpose, it was viewed as 
ill-conceived in its means, and generated a vituperative response from the 
bar,122 as opposed to the hoped for compliance and the ultimate change in 
behavior of lawyers and clients.  These critics maintain it was a mistake to 
introduce the idea of the lawyer as gatekeeper and attempt to impose a 
harsh rule that compounded “noise” with “withdrawal” impinging so deeply 
on confidentiality, the basic tenet of client representation, to then fall short 
of even imposing withdrawal in case of failure of the client corporation to 
take appropriate action.123  Mandatory withdrawal, it is argued, could have 
been a potent tool in preventing misconduct, and in sending a signal to the 
corporation and other lawyers that the entity stands on shaky ground.124 In 
fact, every time a corporation would have to secure a new attorney after the 
withdrawal of the predecessor, the causes of such a drastic act would be 
disclosed and investigated, potentially providing new counsel leverage for 
the client to accede to his compliance demands.125 While lawyers may have 
played a part in corporate scandals, it is not certain whether many of them 
were at the center of the problem or could have averted it.126  In either case, 
according to these voices, a better conceived rule would be one that simply 
withholds the tools for the commission of wrongdoing when all else fails, 
while falling short of reporting out.127
119
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Other commentators have emphasized that when it comes to gate-
keeping rules, allowing jurisdictional experimentation may be a better solu-
tion than imposing the same standard across multiple jurisdictions either 
condoning or outright condemning experimentation and its learning oppor-
tunities.128 The tradeoff is between promoting unimpeded flow of informa-
tion to the gatekeepers through confidentiality rules which may discourage 
adequate response to risk, and promoting adequate response to risk through 
mandatory reporting up, withdrawal, or reporting out, which may cut off the 
flow of information necessary for risk evaluation.129 Better solutions would 
probably emerge from experimentation in each jurisdiction, which allows 
for faster and more focused reaction to outcomes as well as jurisdictional 
competition, regarded as a central component of institutional design.130
Considering the initial thrust of the proposed rules (including “noisy with-
drawal” and a broad jurisdictional reach) and the subsequent retreat, it is 
unlikely that the SEC would aggressively pursue observance by foreign 
attorneys.131
Still other voices noted that the SEC has been relatively lenient with 
lawyers as compared to accountants and executives, and attributed the 
marked difference in treatment to the recognition that lawyers must still 
fulfill their obligation of zealous advocacy in favor of their client.132  Law-
yers, therefore maintain a position quite apart from accountants whose role 
entails third party scrutiny of their client financial records.133  Also, the dif-
ference in treatment can be attributed to the fact that, traditionally, attorneys 
have long-established, strong self-governing bodies committed to creating, 
refining, and enforcing ethical standards with what many regard as a good 
measure of success.134 This commitment is evidenced by the enactment of 
professional standards since the 19th Century, followed by the ABA Canons 
of Professional Ethics, and eventually by the MRPC, which provides the 
basis of each state disciplinary code and rules of professional responsibili-
ty.135  Further, State Bar Associations issue ethical opinions regarding the 
interpretation of the rules and according to which attorneys are expected to 
128
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model their professional behavior; and, lastly, states have grievance systems 
run through the state courts.136
1. Unintended Consequences 
Many commentators have concluded that mandatory reporting rules 
disturb the traditional nature of the attorney-client relationship in the corpo-
rate environment and, instead of furthering the purposes of SOX by improv-
ing corporate governance, reducing misconduct, giving clarity and guidance 
to securities lawyers in reference to their ethical obligations, and ultimately 
protecting the investing public, can instead promote results that run counter 
to SOX’s objectives.137  For example, one criticism is that the rules take a 
static view of the attorney-client relationship and do not consider the effect 
that a change in the power of one party to the relationship produces on the 
other party, suggesting that corporate dynamics will neutralize the intended 
function of the lawyer as gatekeeper.138 This perspective focuses on the like-
ly adaptive behaviors produced by reporting, such as selective information 
sharing with internal counsel, cabining information different lawyers re-
ceive, using of outside counsel to control the flow of information more easi-
ly and because outside counsel can be easily dismissed, and non-lawyers as 
much as possible.139 With available firms, large and small, as outside coun-
sel competing for business and negotiating at different levels with the com-
pany and internal counsel, corporations are likely to negotiate the right mix 
of lawyers’ services to minimize their combined influence via reporting.140
The reporting rules, in this view, end up producing perverse effects, indeed 
reducing the opportunities for lawyers to prevent potentially unlawful con-
duct by their remonstration and persuasion or to identify unlawful conduct 
and exert their influence to eliminate it.141
Also, corporate counsel, eager to avoid liability, will tend to err on the 
side of caution, and potentially waste a lot of time and resources within the 
organization by over-reporting.142 The same fear may tend to produce the 
136
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additional counterproductive, adaptive behavior of information avoidance 
on the part of the lawyer: since the rules do not include a “should have 
known” standard, one way of avoiding the trigger of reporting duties with 
its unsavory repercussions and potential liability for counsel is to actually 
“know” less.143 Sadly, the less informed corporate attorney is also less effec-
tive at delivering professional services to the client. 144 Also, the less in-
formed, less effective attorney costs additional money to the organization 
that depends on the lawyer for advice.  Arguably, for the lawyer to be able 
to identify potential pitfalls, and to educate the client as to the appropriate 
course of action under current law, whose meaning is less than clear cut, 
this likely result is the exact opposite of what the  federalization of profes-
sional responsibility rules was intended to achieve.   
2. Lawyers’ Role Redefined? 
Most dramatically, the rules intending lawyers as gatekeepers of good 
corporate governance challenge the traditional role of the lawyer in an ad-
versarial system.  The attorney in an adversarial system is viewed by many 
as the most unlikely candidate for a watchdog position.145 Placing the attor-
ney in that role is antithetic, not only to the information exchange in an 
atmosphere of trust that is central to effective client representation,146 but to 
the lawyer’s ability to assume and maintain a partisan posture, central to 
preserving the integrity of the system and to the corollary of the lawyer’s 
duty of zealous advocacy on behalf of the client vis-à-vis the counterpart 
and, even more importantly, vis-à-vis the government.147
In this light, the federal rules of professional conduct challenge the 
foundations of the adversarial system, threaten the independence of the bar, 
and redefine the meaning of lawyering, at least in this area of legal practice.  
Indeed, many attorneys rely on their duty of confidentiality to lay the foun-
dation for a relationship of trust, encouraging the client to reveal as much 
detail as possible to facilitate rendering the best legal advice and to minim-
ize surprises later on.148 Mandatory reporting makes lawyers accountable to 
third parties while at the service of the client, placing the lawyer in the un-
enviable position of serving two masters, and reducing the client’s (or its 
agents’) expectation of confidentiality which hinders trust, central to a suc-
143
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cessful attorney-client relationship.149 Although up-the-ladder reporting has 
the ostensible purpose of serving the client, by allowing information of po-
tential wrongdoing to reach the head of the legal department or the BOD for 
correction, the process is likely to produce the undesired effect of depriving 
lawyers of the information they need to properly advise their client.150 This 
likely will not succeed in changing the perspective and behavior of the cor-
porate lawyer to focus on preventing, discouraging, or intercepting and cor-
recting corporate misconduct at the outset, presumably the ultimate purpose 
of the rules.   
For example, Professor Baimbridge notes that SEC rules do little to 
combat the natural tendency of lawyers not to antagonize their employers.151
In his opinion, corporate attorneys inescapably fall into the cognitive bias of 
skewing their analysis of their clients’ conduct in positive terms, and “turn a 
blind eye” to their client’s misconduct.152 Also, even assuming that corpo-
rate attorneys were not victims of this occupational hazard, arguably, as we 
have seen, without mandatory withdrawal or “noisy withdrawal,” the SEC 
rules have no bite to the extent that they fail to provide leverage to the cor-
porate attorney in influencing client’s behavior.153  In this light, the structur-
al attack to the bar’s professional independence and time honored, if not 
perfect, self-regulation is therefore even less justified.  
However, the most poignant and harshest challenge to the federal pro-
fessional responsibility rules, determinative in their final assessment of pro-
priety domestically and internationally, is the one that turns on the very 
structure and philosophy underlying our legal system. This challenge re-
tains its legitimacy even though refinement of the implementation rules and 
prosecutorial discretion by the SEC, as it relates to the “appearing and prac-
ticing” bar, may moderate the sweeping effect of the federal professional 
responsibility rules compared to what was originally anticipated.  It is in-
deed very poor policy to have a prosecutor, and the SEC is primarily a 
prosecutor, in charge of regulating the bar that practices before it.154 It is like 
having the U.S. Attorney’s Office regulating the behavior and professional 
ethics of the criminal defense bar.155 Indeed, the most troublesome aspect is 
that the up-the-ladder reporting provisions apply not only to situations re-
lated to the preparation of disclosure documents, which would be less pro-
149
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foundly troublesome and logically justifiable as part of the overall federal 
intervention on corporate governance, but also to attorneys who are instead 
working on enforcement actions on behalf of their clients.156  Even though 
the SEC may state that it does not intend to impede zealous advocacy, the 
rules turn attorneys into policemen working in part for their clients and in 
part for the SEC.157
Yet another challenge is that the reporting rules go beyond mere viola-
tions of securities laws to encompass breaches of fiduciary duty under state 
law and other violations in general,158 effectively, at least facially, giving 
this newly instituted police core “general jurisdiction.” The imprecise, po-
tentially sweeping phraseology of Section 307 extends reporting to a poten-
tially undetermined array of possible violations.159
The last, but not least bit of irony, is that not only has the economic 
burden of this investigative, fact-gathering, and prosecutorial function been 
placed on the very people and organizations the SEC is after, but also the 
budget for that function has been increased.  In this light, SOX professional 
responsibility rules are a swift move, especially considering that the provi-
sion regarding attorneys was tacked on without much debate,160 to reconfi-
gure corporate internal and external counsel as the privately funded security 
force of the modern corporate governance scheme, a wholly unacceptable 
federal deputization.  
Of course, one of the propelling forces behind the regulations affecting 
lawyers, besides the fact that attorneys do not enjoy widespread esteem as a 
category, is that they were to blame for the recent corporate failures. The 
provisions regulating the bar were intended to punish lawyers for their role 
during the securities bubble, when, as a group, they were perceived as mak-
ing inordinate profits, while turning a blind eye to potential fraudulent 
schemes.161 However, if the purpose was to punish lawyers as a category,162
the profession comes out winning financially and occupationally, at least to 
the extent that the solution incorporated in SOX translates into the need for 
yet more lawyers163 to wade through a regulatory and business environment 
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of ever increasing complexity, even though confidentiality, loyalty, and 
zealous advocacy, time honored earmarks of the profession, may have been 
dealt a deadly blow. 
III. EXPORTING THE SOLUTION 
To get or to maintain access to the U.S. market, now foreign compa-
nies must do much more than simply “divulge the cold numbers behind 
their operations.”164 The environment in which the SEC operates has dra-
matically changed, and foreign issuers have increased exponentially, com-
prising approximately one-third of the capitalization of the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) in 2002 with $4.3 trillion and 17% of the listings from a 
humble beginning of 33 in 1975.165 The increase of foreign issuers in U.S. 
markets has been matched by a decrease of U.S. listings in recent years.166
These days, given the preeminence of foreign issuers in U.S. markets and 
the interdependence of capital markets the world over, the SEC cannot 
promulgate securities regulations without taking into account their impact 
on foreign companies.167 In the past, the SEC granted accommodations and 
exemptions to foreign issuers, to account for differences in corporate go-
vernance environments foreign issuers function within.168 Because of the 
political pressures at the time of enactment, SOX largely ignored these dif-
ferences; at least on its face, SOX seems to reach beyond U.S. borders into 
areas that would generally be the subject of domestic regulation in other 
countries.169
In general, foreign issuers have to adapt their corporate structure and 
their business practices to the U.S. business model, and particularly to the 
“model of corporate governance crafted by the U.S. Congress.”170  This 
presents several problems: (1) it offends traditional rules of comity, which 
respecting other nations’ sovereignty, would favor a deferential approach to 
the laws of other states; (2) it potentially clashes with corporate governance 
models that reflect different value systems and different social systems; and 
(3) it presents unique interpretation challenges because foreign attorneys 
are ill prepared to maneuver through a maze of American-grown legal con-
cepts in figuring out whether they fall within or beyond the purview of the 
rules.  
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A. Extraterritoriality of SOX 
SOX has been considered another aspect of American economic impe-
rialism.171  SOX imposes standards on foreign issuers who are already ob-
liged to follow their own country’s corporate governance rules.172  The ex-
tension of the SEC jurisdiction across international borders is considered 
completely inappropriate, particularly as it pertains to Section 307, because 
it infringes on a purely domestic matter, the rules of professional conduct of 
the legal profession in the respective countries, based on the fact that, occa-
sionally, the attorney may represent a corporate client which, by virtue of 
being listed with the SEC, is subject to the jurisdiction of the SEC.173
Indeed, at the enactment of Section 307 with its original corollaries of 
possible mandates of “noisy withdrawal” and before the adoption of the 
final rules by the SEC, which toned down and made some accommodations 
for international legal practitioners caught in the web of multiple uncertain 
and conflicting professional obligations, the international legal community 
was outraged.174  The International Bar Association requested complete ex-
emption for attorneys not admitted to practice in the Unites States from the 
up-the-ladder reporting requirements.175  The refinements of the final rules, 
requiring the attorney “appearing and practicing” to satisfy specific crite-
ria,176 and excluding foreign attorneys from some of the obligations im-
posed on domestic counsel, have the effect of exempting many, although 
not all, foreign lawyers from the purview of the Rules.  
1. General Principles 
a) Bases for Extraterritorial Jurisdiction. At the outset, the general 
principle of international law is that a nation’s assertion of prescriptive ju-
risdiction, the reach of its laws, does not extend beyond its national territo-
ry.177  Similarly, under traditional canons of statutory construction, there is a 
presumption against extraterritoriality.178  Therefore, the legislation of Con-
171
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gress, unless a contrary intent is shown, does not apply outside of the 
U.S.179 This, in turn, is founded on the basic principle of unnecessary con-
flict avoidance with foreign sovereigns, which is at the basis of Congres-
sional legislation and finds its origin and counterpart in customary interna-
tional law.180  But the question of whether a U.S. law applies to citizens of 
other countries is a question of construction, rather than of sovereign power, 
generally resolved by the courts.181 A brief overview of several traditional 
approaches developed by U.S. courts to decide whether asserting jurisdic-
tion was proper in specific cases, mostly in the context of antitrust and se-
curities, and the position of the Restatement of Foreign Relations and pre-
valent doctrine follows.  
(i) The Territorial Approach. Almost a century ago, in 1909, Jus-
tice Holmes in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., held that when a 
statute is silent it should be construed to apply only within the territory of 
the United States.182  Justice Holmes referred to the almost universal prin-
ciple whereby the character of an act, lawful or unlawful, should be deter-
mined with reference to the territory over which the legitimate power of the 
legislator extends.183
(ii) The Effects Test. The Second Circuit first announced the “effects 
test” in 1968 in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, where the court held that it had 
subject matter jurisdiction where fraudulent extraterritorial conduct had a 
substantial impact on the investors’ market in the U.S. This case dealt with 
a shareholder of a Canadian corporation trading in the Toronto and the U.S. 
stock exchanges that alleged fraud against the shareholders and directors.184
The test, with its vague contours, seems to cast a wide net; however, courts 
have applied it sparingly.185
(iii) The Conduct Test. Under this test, if significant conduct involv-
ing a security fraud violation occurred in the U.S., the jurisdiction of the 
federal court is established regardless of the nationality of the victim.186
179
 Id.
180
 Falencki, supra note 171, at 1219; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, § 40 
(1965). 
181
 Blackmer v. U.S., 284 U.S. 421 (1932) (holding that a statute providing for service by consul 
on witnesses abroad who are U.S. citizens and for ensuing contempt proceedings whereby property of 
the witness may be seized following notice, service and failure to appear does not deny due process and 
is therefore valid). 
182
 American Banana, 213 U.S. at 357.  
183
 Id. at 356. 
184 Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 204-08 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (holding § 10(b) 
applicable even when the fraudulent acts were committed outside of the U.S. and the securities belonged 
to a foreign company doing business in the U.S. where the transaction involves listed securities and are 
detrimental to the interests of American investors).  
185
 Jonathan Shirley, Note, International Law and the Ramifications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002, 27 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 501, 519 (2004). 
186
 Id. at 520.   
488 FIU Law Review [3:461
Different circuits approach the application of this test more or less rigidly. 
For example, the Second Circuit uses the test most rigidly, while the Third, 
Eighth and Ninth Circuits take a less rigid view whereby any significant 
activity taking place in the U.S. in furtherance of a fraudulent scheme can 
provide the basis for jurisdiction.187
(iv) The Balancing Approach.  By the time Judge Choy wrote his 
opinion in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America in 1976, American 
Banana had been limited to its facts and there was no doubt that at least 
American antitrust laws would apply to conduct taking place in other na-
tions.188 It was clearly understood that extraterritorial assertion of jurisdic-
tion was a concern for foreign nations, and they might resent “broad asser-
tions of authority by American courts.”189 Judge Choy opted for the applica-
tion of a “jurisdictional rule of reason,”190 weighing a number of factors to 
decide whether the “links to the United States . . . are sufficiently strong, 
vis-à-vis those of other nations, to justify an assertion of extraterritorial 
authority.”191 He considered conflicts with foreign law or policy; nationali-
ty; allegiance of parties; and locations or principal places of business, and 
the extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected to achieve 
compliance. He further considered the relative significance of effects on the 
U.S. as opposed to elsewhere, the existence of an explicit purpose to harm 
American commerce, the forseeability of such an effect, and the relative 
importance to the violations charged that they be conducted within the 
United States as opposed to abroad.192 In determining whether U.S. contacts 
and interests are sufficient to support extraterritorial jurisdiction, in respect 
of comity and fairness principles, the court is not required to evaluate for-
eign law or policy, but the legitimacy of the interests of each nation, and the 
court needs to evaluate only the concern of each state with the suit at 
hand.193
(v) The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations. Even though 
not binding on courts, it includes the broadest statement of extraterritorial 
reach of U.S. securities regulations, stating that courts have jurisdiction 
over conduct predominantly occurring in the U.S. related to a securities 
transaction, even if the transaction itself takes place outside of the U.S., 
including investment advice or solicitation of proxies or of consents with 
respect to securities.194 The U.S. exercise of jurisdiction to prescribe de-
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pends on (a) whether the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable in light of the 
conduct’s expected substantial effect on the U.S. securities markets; (b) 
whether representations or negotiations are conducted in the U.S.; (c) 
whether the party to be subjected to jurisdiction is an American or a fo-
reigner; or (d) whether the party to be protected is a U.S. national or resi-
dent.195
(vi) Evidence of direct conflict with laws regulating the same issue.
This test, adopted by some scholars, and also reflected in the Restatement 
(Second) of Foreign Relations Law § 40, looks at the interests of the com-
peting countries in regulating the conduct, and if there is a conflict, then 
principles of comity apply.196 Each state in a situation of conflict is required 
by international law to moderate the exercise of its enforcement jurisdic-
tion.197
b) Extraterritoriality of Securities Law: Regulation S.  SOX is directed 
at issuers. Any foreign company that wants to list its securities in the 
NYSE, American Stock Exchange or Nasdaq must register with the SEC 
and, therefore, comes under the purview of SOX.  However, SOX does not 
add to the extraterritorial applicability of U.S. securities laws; consequently, 
its extraterritorial reach is determined by reference to other securities 
laws.198  In the ambit of the extraterritorial reach of U.S. securities laws, a 
duality exists. On one side, Regulation S, adopted by the SEC in 1990, spe-
cifies when securities transactions fall outside of the reach of U.S. securities 
laws, codifying the territorial reach of Section 5 of the Securities Act of 
1933, which was previously left to the interpretation of the courts.199 It sets 
forth two conditions for issuing and reselling unregistered securities:  
1. The offer or sale must be made in an “offshore transaction”; and 
2. No “directed selling efforts” can be made in the United States.200
An offshore transaction occurs when the offer was not made to someone in 
the United States and either the buyer is outside of the U.S., or the transac-
tion is executed on a foreign exchange.201 “Directed selling” means any 
activity in preparation for the sale of those securities, such as road shows or 
advertising efforts taking place in the United States.202  Regulation S clari-
195
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fied the reach of U.S. securities registration requirements, preventing appli-
cation of those requirements from interfering with the sovereignty of other 
countries.203
c) Enforcement of the Anti-Fraud Provisions.  On the other hand, since 
the anti-fraud provisions of the U.S. securities laws are seen as a corner-
stone in promoting stability of the U.S. capital markets, and in protecting 
investors, their territorial application is considered broader.204  For example, 
when Rule 10b-5 was promulgated, since the bulk of securities transactions 
were predominantly in the domestic market, there was scant attention to the 
rule’s far-reaching language, while the U.S. Congress and the SEC re-
mained silent on its territorial reach. Therefore, the courts were left to de-
fine this area, and, as noted above,205 they continue to be divided on the 
factors establishing jurisdiction.206 Consequently, investors and issuers in 
international transactions face uncertainties regarding the applicability of 
the antifraud provisions.207
d) Extraterritoriality of U.S. Ethics Rules for Lawyers.  Recognizing 
the increasing prevalence of cross-border practice,208 the MRPC has also 
undertaken to state its extraterritorial reach in the 2003 revisions, specifying 
how lawyers’ ethics rules are to be understood and applied to U.S. lawyers 
practicing abroad.  MRPC R. 8.5 states that a lawyer admitted to practice in 
one jurisdiction is subject to the rules of that jurisdiction as well as of those 
where the conduct occurred, and can be subject to discipline in both.209
Choice of law is determined in favor of the jurisdiction where the tribunal 
sits “for conduct in connection with a matter pending before a tribunal,”210
and for any other conduct, either where it occurred, or where the predomi-
nant effect of the conduct occurred.211 On the other hand, the lawyer will not 
be subject to discipline if his conduct conforms to the ethics rules of the 
jurisdiction where he reasonably believed the predominant effect would 
occur.
212
 These provisions apply to lawyers in transnational practice “unless 
international law, treaties or other agreements between competent regulato-
ry authorities . . . provide otherwise.”213
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By giving priority to the rules of the tribunal where the matter is pend-
ing, MRPC R. 8.5 encourages respect of the rules of conduct of the foreign 
country of transnational practice.214 The disposition is worded with a view 
to international application and has a broad reach, as demonstrated by the 
use of the word “tribunal,” which encompasses a wider range of judicial 
bodies, as opposed to the narrower term “court”.215 Although the lawyer is 
given some leeway with respect to which discipline norm to follow, it is a 
choice based on reasonable belief, not a choice to ignore U.S. rules in case 
of doubt.216
2. How Much Extraterritoriality?
Although the legislative history of SOX shows no specific intent re-
garding its applicability abroad,217 by its plain language, it is directed at 
issuers and their employees and consultants wherever located.  Applicabili-
ty of SOX is subordinate to being an issuer, and therefore, it is conditioned 
on the issuer being subject to registration.218 In this context, the extraterrito-
riality of SOX is limited under Regulation S, and therefore, there is no risk 
that SOX will ensnare a foreign transaction that would not have fallen un-
der U.S. jurisdiction prior to the passage of SOX.219 Based on these obser-
vations, it would seem that SOX would raise little concern abroad; howev-
er, the opposite has been true.220
Indeed SOX has restricted access to the U.S. capital markets by for-
eign issuers because, in addition to complying with registration provisions 
and providing disclosure of numbers behind their operations, now the for-
eign issuer is forced to conform to the model of corporate governance envi-
sioned by the U.S. Congress.221 SOX has been another example, probably 
the most relevant to date, where the U.S. is asserting its role of international 
corporate regulator, based on its own perception of the needs brought about 
by the globalization of markets, with little respect for either sovereignty of 
other nations or principles of comity. Thus, the U.S. is promulgating rules 
that appear in conflict with principles of public international law regarding 
the basis for the exercise of jurisdiction.222 In addition, there is an anticom-
petitive aspect to SOX in that compliance costs are much higher for foreign 
as opposed to domestic issuers. Foreign issuers face a higher risk of error 
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and, consequently, of criminal liability, and exemptions favor U.S. issu-
ers.
223
  Of course the defense to these contentions is that foreign companies 
chose to subject themselves to the rules, and they can likewise chose to de-
list.224  But this argument does little to justify a policy stance that discourag-
es foreign access to the U.S. capital markets when free access to the U.S. 
markets ultimately benefits the U.S. economy as well.225
Indeed, the high price of SOX compliance for foreign companies caus-
es American stock exchanges to suffer diminished appeal with foreign issu-
ers.
226
 Several powerful companies, such as Japanese Daiwa, German 
Porsche, and UK Benfield Insurance have delayed listing on the NYSE due 
to SOX, even after the SEC exemptions were introduced.227  On the other 
hand, competitive foreign exchanges, such as the London Stock Exchange 
(LSE) and Euronext are emerging as a welcoming alternative for foreign 
issuers spooked by the excessive requirements of SOX.228
a) The U.S. Should Exercise Restraint Based on Principles of Interna-
tional Law and Comity.  Foreign commentators have noted, on one hand, 
that SOX is tailor-made to respond to American problems and violates prin-
ciples expressed in multilateral agreements, such as NAFTA, Bilateral 
Agreements (BITs), and the World Trade Organization (WTO).229 A better 
approach to promoting compliance with acceptable reporting standards may 
have been, not to pass new legislation through Congress, but to negotiate 
Mutual Recognition Agreements to achieve the same objectives, thereby 
avoiding potential interference with foreign sovereignty.230
Along the same reasoning, others advocate for the SEC to adopt a 
pragmatic approach to SOX extraterritorial reach, realizing that multiple 
provisions are in direct conflict with foreign law. Under principles of comi-
ty, such a situation suggests enforcement restraint, and the author recom-
mends that the SEC grant relief to foreign issuers through a situation-
specific no action process.231 This approach is favored because it would 
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create an atmosphere of regulatory cooperation, as opposed to regulatory 
alienation with foreign governments and companies, which will ultimately 
benefit U.S. investors. This would promote the retention of foreign issuers, 
while maintaining the cooperation threads that are essential in enforcing 
securities regulations abroad in the global market.232 This approach would 
also be a viable alternative to both strict enforcement, which may prove 
contentious, if not impossible, and to the likewise counterproductive ap-
proach of a blanket exceptive relief, which would subvert the purposes of 
the Act.233
b) The U.S. Should Exercise Restraint Based on Structural Differences 
Between Domestic and Foreign Corporate Governance. Unmitigated extra-
territorial reach, besides breaking with traditional international law prin-
ciples and canons of construction, produces additional challenges. Due to 
differences in the bases of corporate structure and governance in foreign 
countries, conflicts with related laws that SOX is, of course, not anticipat-
ing or taking into account may affect the operation of subsidiaries of multi-
nationals listed with the SEC as well as foreign issuers in general.  At the 
risk of stating the obvious, the philosophical and ideological differences 
underlying foreign legal and economic systems make many domestic con-
structs and concepts inapplicable or not susceptible of comprehension 
abroad, even after thoughtful translation and even though they may be per-
fect for the place of origin.  Uncertainties and misapprehensions follow.  It 
is indeed overly simplistic to think that mere transplantation of rules from a 
different legal environment may successfully curb incentives to engage in 
misconduct in a different system. The idea of using stopgaps—such as the 
lawyers as gatekeeper—as an effective tool to investigate and prevent cor-
porate malfeasance the world over is an example of this one-size-fits-all 
mentality. 
Corporate structure and governance, just like the legal and social or-
ders, tend to reflect the culture they originate into, a nation’s values.  For 
example, the principles of individual accountability and independence in 
corporate governance, which are presumed for the applicability of SOX and 
for it to achieve its purposes, directly clash with corporate governance 
norms in Germany or in Japan. These countries boast a significant numeri-
cal presence of SEC-listed organizations, and are founded on collective 
decision making and pervasive employee participation in management.234
Consequently, Section 301 of SOX, geared at protecting the independence 
of the audit committee, contrasts with civil law regulatory systems based on 
a dual-board system composed of a management board, which does not 
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have independent directors, and a supervisory board, which includes em-
ployees and union representatives.235
Another illustration of the difficulty in making rules that cross juris-
diction, and of the inherent challenges in extending domestic norms to for-
eign settings, is the meaning of specific terms, such as fiduciary duty .  The 
concept of fiduciary duty does not quite translate to identify the same no-
tion in many civil law countries.236 In common law countries, the duty of 
care refers to the prudence that managers are expected to exercise in carry-
ing out supervision and decision-making. It has been refined by U.S. courts 
for the protection of investors in multiple corporate situations.237  By con-
trast, the concept of fiduciary duty is not as refined in civil law countries 
where different methods of police management are in place, such as state 
interest in major corporations, with ensuing government controls not impli-
cating the courts.238
c) SOX may Exert More Influence Internationally by its Persuasive-
ness.  The U.S. could attain the goal of influencing legislation international-
ly by the sheer persuasiveness of many SOX rules and the purposes under-
lying them, since many countries are looking for guidance in devising and 
implementing their own corporate reforms.  Indeed, many countries around 
the world have experienced problems of corporate governance and have 
been struggling with reforming their own corporate governance rules for 
quite some time.239  It stands to reason that most countries would look to 
U.S. legislation, fairly well developed in this area, for guidance.   
In the U.S., SOX represented a departure from the traditional approach 
of securities regulations, bringing under the federal umbrella areas of law 
heretofore left to non-federal fora.240  Indeed, federal law was historically 
aimed at protecting capital markets via registration, financial disclosure 
requirements and anti-fraud provisions embodied in the Securities Act of 
1933 and the Security and Exchange Act of 1934, while corporate entities 
were traditionally organized under state law, and the accounting and legal 
professions were under self-regulation.241  The dynamics of the corporate 
scandals of large proportions, which ultimately precipitated swift legislative 
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reaction, brought into sharp focus the fact that the corporate attorneys and 
accountants involved failed to identify and report corporate misconduct, 
and led Congress to conclude that basic principles and practices of corpo-
rate governance for public companies had to be put in place at the federal 
level.242 It was a matter of national economic security.   
While the U.S was struggling with its own corporate debacles, many 
countries in the industrialized world were faced with the sudden fall of cor-
porate giants under the weight of elaborate frauds, ultimately affecting the 
investing public.  Many foreign countries have undergone and are under-
going sweeping reforms. For example, in Italy, the entire legislative struc-
ture underlying business organizations has been reformulated and moder-
nized during a legislative process that started in 2001 and entered into effect 
in 2004.243 Likewise, Spain’s corporate environment, traditionally accused 
of being dominated by a “clubby atmosphere,” has been changing dramati-
cally in recent years.244 A corporate reform, started in the 1990s, finally was 
passed into law in 2003.245  Even though the legal reform may not find in-
stantaneous application, while questions remain open about its enforceabili-
ty, Spain is said to have embraced the post-Enron era by undertaking a 
transformation under the guiding principle of transparency.246 The engine 
that drives transformation of corporate law and corporate governance rules 
and practices throughout Europe is not the regulators, but globalization and 
the demands of the global marketplace.247
At this juncture, while legal and economic commentators criticized the 
bold moves of the U.S. federal government in its pretenses vis-à-vis the 
global marketplace, SOX quickly became the object of just as much analy-
sis geared at understanding its structure, purposes, efficiencies, and at iden-
tifying those concepts, methods, and rules that could indeed be reproduced 
or used as a model for foreign legal and regulatory schemes.248  SOX be-
came, in fact, one of the most studied pieces of U.S. federal legislation in 
recent years, and presently seems to provide, for better or for worse, the 
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lexicon of corporate governance models globally.249  In this somewhat 
forced U.S. federal law mania, the SOX regulations affecting lawyers have 
taken lesser relief as compared to rules affecting the accounting profession 
and the role of corporate executives in the evolution of corporate law 
worldwide because a comparatively smaller number of SOX provisions 
relate to attorneys, and the SEC final rules have somewhat lessened the 
original potential bite of the reporting dispositions.  
B. SOX and the Foreign Bar- Problems of Interpretation of U.S. Rules  
Abroad 
Foreign attorneys are ill-equipped to evaluate the meaning of U.S. law 
to make an educated decision regarding whether they personally fall within 
the purview of the rule, and whether the conduct they are faced with falls 
within the reporting rules.  They are required to navigate a “legal mine-
field,”250 an interconnected multiplicity of legal issues, legal definitions, and 
processes they are perforce not familiar with.  
1. The Non-Appearing Foreign Attorney 
The first subject area where the foreign attorney is likely to get con-
fused is the safe harbor provision of the SEC rules.251 Who is the non-
appearing foreign attorney, and how does the foreign lawyer make a deter-
mination as to whether the SEC professional conduct rules apply to him or 
his firm?  A non-appearing foreign attorney is an attorney:  
(1) who is admitted to practice law in a jurisdiction outside of the 
United States; (2) who does not hold himself or herself out as practic-
ing, and does not give legal advice regarding, United States Federal 
securities or other law . . .; and (3) who: (i) conducts activities that 
would constitute appearing and practicing before the Commission on-
ly incidentally to . . .  the practice of law in a jurisdiction outside the 
United States . . .  .252
The last qualification in the rules, the safe harbor for the foreign attor-
ney appearing “only incidentally,” was introduced in response to feedback 
during the comment phase of the rulemaking process.253  Likewise, a further 
qualification that limits applicability of the rules to the foreign attorney who 
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appears before the SEC in consultation with an attorney licensed to practice 
in the U.S. was introduced during rulemaking.254 Also, a foreign attorney 
does not have to comply if compliance is prohibited by applicable foreign 
law.255  It bears noting that the originally proposed rule did not distinguish 
between the obligations of domestic and foreign attorneys, and the SEC 
specifically requested comments from attorneys in foreign jurisdictions and 
attorneys subject to foreign law because it realized that the rules could sub-
ject foreign lawyers to conflicting standards and obligations.256
Even though the rule seems rather straightforward, the only simple de-
termination is the first, namely, whether the attorney is admitted to practice 
in a foreign country.  After that, the rule is structured in terms that hold 
meaning only by reference to American legal theories, even though specifi-
cally directed at regulating safe harbors for the foreign legal practitioner.  
Indeed, it is unlikely that a foreign attorney would be able to evaluate the 
meaning of the phrase “holding themselves out” as practicing in the U.S., 
while the rule provides no guidance on the subject.257  Likewise, the rule 
does not give guidance as to the circumstances that would qualify the prac-
tice in front of the SEC as incidental or how much cooperation with a U.S. 
lawyer would either include or exempt the foreign lawyer from the rule.258
Many foreign firms that sent in comment letters to the SEC during the 
comment phase expressed concern, and requested that non-U.S. attorneys 
be exempted altogether, while others asked that the SEC consider the poten-
tial for conflict and exempt foreign attorneys in the interim.259 In the end, 
the SEC rejected all notions of exempting foreign attorneys altogether, re-
commending that those concerned about whether they fall within the pur-
view of the rules should simply seek the advice of U.S. counsel.  The SEC 
took the position that the rule is clear regarding what is outside of the defi-
nition of “appearing and practicing.” Based on § 205.2(a), the simple prepa-
ration of a document that may be included as an exhibit into an SEC filing 
does not constitute “appearing and practicing” before the Commission un-
less “the attorney has notice that the document will be filed with or submit-
ted to the SEC, and he or she provided advice on [U.S.] securities law in 
preparing the document.”260
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2. When is Reporting Required? 
Another aspect where confusion is likely, regarding the applicability of 
the rules to foreign attorneys, is in determining under what circumstances 
the reporting requirement is triggered.  As noted earlier, up-the-ladder re-
porting is required when there is credible evidence of a material violation 
by the issuer of U.S. federal or state securities law, or a material breach of 
fiduciary duty or other similar violation; the standard is whether a prudent 
and competent attorney is reasonably likely to become aware of the materi-
al violation.261 Foreign attorneys are likely to lack the professional expertise 
to determine under what circumstances the conditions of compliance with 
the rule are met.262
It is clear that the rule does not apply to violations of foreign law; ra-
ther, it is triggered by the violation of U.S. federal or state law.263 But clarity 
ends there.  For example, the SEC purposely left the definition of the word 
“material” open, to be defined by reference to established federal law, un-
likely to be at the fingertips of any foreign attorney, which defines material 
violation as “conduct or information about which a reasonable investor 
would want to be informed before making an investment decision.” 264  The 
definition is not necessarily free from ambiguities for the domestic practi-
tioner either.  
Another issue of confusion, which ties in with the safe harbor provi-
sions, as opposed to those instances when reporting up-the-ladder may be 
required, is exclusion from the rule if compliance would expose the foreign 
lawyer to sanction or other prohibition by foreign law.265 Here, SEC com-
pliance requirements would seem to extend as far as allowed by foreign 
law.266
The next issue relates to the concept of sufficient evidence. Section 
307 and rule 205 require the attorney to report evidence of material viola-
tion.  As noted above, the standard is reasonable likelihood, a conclusion of 
preponderance of the evidence based on a factual analysis that may be prob-
lematic for a U.S. attorney, and that is likely to be even more problematic 
for the foreign attorney not accustomed to the American legal standards of 
preponderance of the evidence, clear and convincing, and beyond a reason-
able doubt.   
In addition, unpredictability in the enforcement of Section 307 and 
rule 205 can unduly raise the fear of liability and produce an environment 
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where shareholders and the public receive even less protection in the inter-
national arena.267 The uncertain reach and enforcement of the rules can 
cause the international corporate client to seek out the services of an Ameri-
can lawyer with whom candid and ongoing communication is likely to be 
dampened by language and cultural barriers.  On the other hand, a lawyer 
faced with perceived strict rules may over-report, thus chilling the flow of 
information necessary to his function as a lawyer and his newly appointed 
duty of roving investigator.268 In sum, as applicable to the foreign bar, due to 
overlapping norms, uncertainty of application, and misapprehension of the 
law, the reporting rules can have an even higher counter-productive effect 
than with the domestic bar.  
3. Supervising Attorneys 
The rules related to the responsibility of supervising attorneys are also 
relevant for the attorney of foreign issuers. A supervising attorney is one 
who supervises or directs another attorney appearing and practicing before 
the SEC in representation of an issuer.269  Based on MRPC R. 5.1(b) and 
(c)(1) and SEC rules §§ 205.4 and 205.5, when the subordinate attorney 
reports evidence of a material violation to the supervisory attorney, the lat-
ter becomes responsible to comply with the reporting requirements of § 
205.3.270  If the supervising attorney provides direction to the subordinate, 
albeit only in matters related to the subordinate attorney’s appearance be-
fore the SEC, he would qualify as a supervising attorney.271 The potential 
implications for foreign issuers are significant since any foreign attorney of 
an issuer is in fact supervising a U.S. attorney “appearing and practicing” 
before the SEC, and therefore shares responsibility, at least to a certain ex-
tent, regarding reporting compliance.272
4. Discipline and Sanctions 
The discipline and sanction provisions of the rules start by saying that 
attorneys who violate § 205 are subject to the civil penalties and remedies 
applicable for violation of U.S. federal securities laws in an action brought 
by the SEC.273 The right of action under the rules belongs to the SEC only, 
as no private right of action is admitted against attorneys or issuers based 
267
 Harper, supra note 137, at 163; Greene, supra note 54, at 847 (stating that turning lawyers into 
watchdogs may end up causing the issuer to become more secretive and break even more laws by ignor-
ance than they ever did intentionally). 
268
 See id. at 848. 
269
 17 C.F.R. § 205.4(a) (2003). 
270
 Greene, supra note 54, at 841-42. 
271
 Id. at 842.  
272
 Id.   
273
 17 C.F.R § 205.6(a) (2003).  
500 FIU Law Review [3:461
on the further clarifications provided in § 205.7, which resolved the debate 
previously left open by the rules. However, § 205.6(b) specifies that an at-
torney appearing and practicing before the SEC is subject to the discipli-
nary authority of the SEC even though he may simultaneously be subject to 
discipline for the same conduct where the attorney is admitted to practice.274
A foreign attorney could be subject to discipline by the SEC and the discip-
linary authority of his home country imposing contrasting duties and requir-
ing him to choose which to violate (or to comply with) if it were not for the 
later introduced § 205(d), which provides that “an attorney practicing out-
side of the United States shall not be required to comply with the require-
ments of this part to the extent that such compliance is prohibited by appli-
cable foreign law.”275 Still, the foreign attorney is required to comply with 
the SEC rules to the maximum extent permitted by the foreign law applica-
ble to him.276
The foreign bar is still concerned about the applicability of SOX rules 
of professional responsibility, especially in relation to the trend for lawyers 
to be invested with increasingly essential functions in business operations, 
including strategic planning, solving business problems, and advising on 
risk management.277 Overall, the most lamented negative repercussion so far 
is more time spent on studying regulations, more time spent on fulfilling 
reporting requirements, and in general more paperwork, with enormous 
expenditure of resources for the issuer in attorneys’ time and executive in-
vestigative time.278
C. Foreign Responses to Corporate Scandals  
Different nations have adopted a variety of approaches to the chal-
lenges of transparency and accountability of corporations to their constitu-
ents, and there have been a variety of reactions to the recent financial de-
bacles, large and small.  The idea of enlisting corporate lawyers for the un-
enviable task of policing their clients has occurred in other contexts, al-
though not to the extent envisioned by SOX, which seems to be peculiar to 
the U.S. approach. 
1. A Lighter Hand: the European Union (E.U.) Legislation 
While the U.S. decided to federalize corporate governance rules, the 
E.U., facing similar challenges to investors’ confidence after corporate 
scandals of similar resonance, such as Parmalat and Cirio, considered that 
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codification at the European level was going to have very little impact, 
since there is great variance among the member states securities and corpo-
rate laws, which are still expected to take many years and much work to 
harmonize.279  Europeans take a different view of the potential effectiveness 
of a single code to regulate the activities of individuals inside corpora-
tions.280  In 2001, a group of appointed experts recommended not to attempt 
a single code, but to endeavor to promote harmonization of member legisla-
tion by promulgating general, non-binding principles and rules to allow 
Member States to learn from each other by passing a directive which makes 
it mandatory for companies to disclose their governance policies, but leaves 
to each Member State the task of specifying the content of such disclo-
sures.
281
  In 2003, the European Commission presented an Action Plan for 
“Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the 
E.U.,” a set of proposals to better coordinate Member State initiatives, es-
tablishing a broad E.U. framework but allowing a degree of Member State 
flexibility in three phases stretching through 2009.282  In response, many of 
the E.U. Member States have since been active in promulgating reforms to 
their corporate and societal systems in recent years, tending to bring the 
individual country’s legal framework up to par with the global market-
place.283
2. Conflicts in Germany 
German issuers concerned with the increased costs imposed by SOX 
on foreign issuers, and with the fact that many of its provisions are incom-
patible with German corporate governance mechanisms, postponed listing 
with the NYSE. 284 For example, following SOX, Porsche postponed its 
NYSE listing and questioned whether it was necessary or advisable for it to 
entertain this step, and 24 German companies met to discuss the effects of 
U.S. law and how it directly conflicts with German law.285
The corporate structure in Germany is two-tiered: it is composed of a 
management board, which has duties similar to the American BOD, and a 
supervisory board. However, unlike in the U.S., there is no CEO to whom 
the others report, and it would not make sense to hold any one individual 
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member of the management board responsible in lieu of the group.286 This 
difference makes compliance with SOX particularly challenging and costly.  
3. Corporate Governance Regime in the United Kingdom (U.K.)
Bankers and lawyers in the U.K. believe that SOX does not fit their 
corporate governance reality, and that the model of corporate governance 
which prevails in the U.K. overlaps with SOX.  In fact, many corporate 
provisions similar to the ones of SOX have already been enacted and are 
systematically implemented, well-defined and complied with, as they have 
been evolving for over a decade.287 There is in effect a Code of Corporate 
Governance which lists principles and practices for the companies listed on 
the London Stock Exchange (LSE); as a supplement, the Smith Rules assist 
companies in implementing audit committees, making SOX unnecessarily 
duplicative.288
Further, under the Companies Act of 1985, directors of U.K. compa-
nies have a statutory duty to compile accounts that give a true and fair view 
of the state of affairs of the corporation and its profits and losses, and they 
are criminally liable for failure to comply.289 According to the view of Brit-
ish solicitors, the system is inspired to a “comply or explain” approach and 
provides a high level of corporate governance regulation and compliance 
with no need to superimpose the largely duplicative, “Draconian and ill 
thought-out” U.S. law.290
4. The Hong Kong Negotiated Solution 
Having suffered through a wave of corporate scandals, Hong Kong, 
just like the U.S., has examined the role of lawyers and introduced meas-
ures to enlist them in policing corporate governance.291 Hong Kong actually 
started to address the issue back in 1996, several years prior to the U.S., 
when the Hong Kong Law Society and the Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
negotiated a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which defines the 
expectations of the Exchange as it pertains to the conduct of solicitors 
representing listed companies.292  Then, the Hong Kong Standing Commit-
tee on Company Law Reform (SCCLR) released Phase I of its report and 
proposed regulations in 2001, and, in the wake of recent scandals, in 2004, 
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the SCCLR issued Phase II of its report on reforms needed.293  Both coun-
tries are experiencing the unintended consequences of their attempts to 
ameliorate and monitor corporate governance, albeit with different ap-
proaches, by regulating lawyer’s conduct and relying on lawyers as agents 
of control.294
In Hong Kong, solicitors are self-regulated through the Law Society, 
roughly similar to the state bar associations in the U.S, which maintains 
rules, the Guide to Professional Conduct, similar to the domestic state rules 
of professional conduct.295 Unlike the U.S., in Hong Kong, the Law Society 
and the Exchange had the foresight to anticipate that lawyers would have a 
role to play in corporate securities law violations and to cooperate to pro-
duce the MOU.296 There are three instances where the conduct of the solici-
tor would subject him to discipline by the Exchange, as opposed to the Law 
Society: 
1. Making an untrue representation to the Exchange (knowingly or 
recklessly) either per the instruction of the client or directly by the so-
licitor without reasonable inquiry as to the truthfulness of the same; 
2. Knowingly or recklessly facilitating or participating in a breach of 
the listing rules; 
3. Knowingly or unreasonably failing to advise the clients in relation 
to the requirements of the listing rules.297
Even though it represents an example of cooperation and foresight, the 
MOU has not been effective in preventing corporate fraud, stopping solici-
tors from aiding corporations in defrauding minority shareholders or looting 
company resources; and it has never been used in a disciplinary proceed-
ing.298
Hong Kong negotiated an enforcement agreement between entities, 
while in the U.S., the SEC attempts to strong-arm the attorneys into com-
pliance with disclosure rules.  Unfortunately, it seems that both approaches, 
while possibly in line with their respective cultures, fail to accomplish the 
ultimate goal.  
5. Impact on Canadian Lawyers 
Since Canada is the largest foreign issuer in the U.S. exchanges, the 
impact of the reporting rule on Canadian lawyers becomes particularly rele-
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vant.299 Canadian lawyers are subject to the rules of professional conduct of 
the various provinces and territories where they practice, and only the Law 
Society of Ontario, which recently modified its rules to harmonize with the 
U.S., imposes mandatory up-the-ladder reporting on corporate attorneys, 
while all the other codes have permissive rules on the subject.300 Canadian 
lawyers, therefore, may be subject to liability, both under the jurisdiction of 
the SEC and under their codes of professional conduct.301
Canadian codes of professional conduct emphasizing integrity, which 
is said to be a unique tradition of Canadian lawyers’ ethics, are characte-
rized by an exhortatory tone and look beyond partisanship to encourage the 
bar to act in the best interest of the community.302 On this backdrop, Cana-
dian lawyers subject to the SEC may over-report, causing managers and 
officers of the issuers to be guarded about how much information they share 
with their counsel.303  If U.S. lawyers are chosen instead, managers and of-
ficers of the issuers may refrain from divulging information that may lead 
to uncovering misconduct to a lawyer who is less knowledgeable on Cana-
dian custom.304 Clearly, either option is likely to produce less protection for 
the investor.305  Alternatively, both Canadian and U.S attorneys may be on 
the job.306  In this situation, the Canadian attorney benefits from the safe 
harbor, and only the U.S attorney faces liability for misconduct.307 The Ca-
nadian attorney may not.308 Yet another alternative is for issuers to avail 
themselves of the help of legal experts who are outside the purview of the 
rules.309 In all alternatives, the up-the-ladder reporting rules impose high 
transaction costs without yielding the hoped-for result of guaranteeing in-
vestor protection.310   
IV. WHAT SHOULD FOREIGN LAWYERS DO?
The suggestions for proper compliance for foreign attorneys are rela-
tively simple, yet not easy to implement right away, and definitively not 
without cost.  Lawyers of foreign issuers should become familiar with U.S. 
securities laws and with SOX professional responsibilities rules. Otherwise, 
unless they meet the definition of  non-appearing, the only way they could 
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effectively avoid liability is to decline to give advice on U.S. securities or to 
seek the support of U.S. counsel any time they get involved in legal analy-
sis which could constitute appearing and practicing in front of the Commis-
sion.311  The conclusion is supported by the fact that SOX does not define 
the meaning of material in regards to material violation, relying, as noted 
earlier, on its well-established meaning under federal law. The only way the 
foreign attorney can be comfortable in appreciating whether he may be in 
fact faced with such a situation312 is to become conversant in securities 
laws, SOX provisions, and U.S. federal law in general.   
Another solution implicit in the rules is, of course, to retain a U.S. law 
firm.  Although it may not fully protect from supervisory liability, it defini-
tively places the U.S. legal expertise at the service of the foreign company 
listed in the exchange, avoiding misapprehension of the law, and to a large 
extent, confusion. 
Also, foreign issuers should make sure that their legal department has 
a structure characterized by a clear hierarchy and clear definition of respon-
sibilities, so that only “supervising” attorneys are charged with the duty of 
up-the-ladder reporting, thereby minimizing the exposure of subordinates 
and reducing reporting time and effort.313
Another suggestion is for general counsel to establish regular meetings 
with officers and executives on the subject of potential breaches of law and 
duty, promoting understanding and fostering compliance, rather than a men-
tality whereby these meetings only happen in times of crisis314 where emo-
tions likely run high and everyone is functioning in a reactive mode. This 
should actually be part of a process of education for corporate executives 
regarding the relevant dispositions to equip them to be more vigilant with 
respect to potential evidence of material violations, which should percolate 
through the organization via information and procedures for handling re-
ceipt of reports and investigation of possible material violations of U.S. 
securities laws.315 These suggestions, of course, generate a significant in-
crease in transaction costs, which many foreign issuers take into account 
when deciding whether the cost of listing is matched by the rewards of 
access to the U.S. capital markets.  
V. CONCLUSION
SOX reaches across borders to impose on foreign attorneys duties to 
their client-corporations by virtue of the fact that the foreign issuers have 
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registered with the SEC for the privilege of access to the U.S. capital mar-
kets. The U.S. federal government is thus attempting to export a novel and, 
as yet, experimental regulatory system, which breaks with an established 
tradition of state regulation and self-regulation.  SOX professional conduct 
norms are understandably resisted by the domestic bar where the remonstra-
tions center around the fact that Section 307 compromises the independence 
of the profession, deals a fatal blow to the duty of confidentiality, the pillar 
of the attorney-client relationship, and even compromises the foundation of 
the adversarial system, intending to deputize the corporate lawyer for the 
benefit of the SEC’s investigative needs, and asking him to prioritize the 
interests of third parties, as opposed to the interests of his employer, to loyal 
and expert legal advice.  
SOX rules may have been a well-intentioned part of the grand scheme 
of imposing a more responsible behavior on corporate entities vis-à-vis the 
investment base and the public in general.  However, while imposing on the 
bar the superhuman task of serving two masters, the rules do not hold prom-
ise to enhance transparency and accountability, or to bring about behavioral 
changes inspired to higher ethical and moral standards in the corporate are-
na. Instead, SOX compliance has been causing an increase in transaction 
costs throughout listed companies, an increase in the lawyer’s work, a like-
ly chill in the flow of information to corporate counsel, and has possibly 
made counsel less effective in providing legal advice, spotting potential 
problems, or persuading the clients to follow legally acceptable courses of 
conduct.  
These problems are only exacerbated as it pertains to the foreign bar.  
Besides the unresolved question regarding the general propriety of extend-
ing the SEC’s jurisdiction to the foreign bar, even if only by way of volun-
tary choice of the foreign issuer to be listed, the U.S. federal rules of con-
duct for lawyers, already at odds with domestic state rules, are likely to be 
even more distant, and therefore in dissonance with foreign rules of profes-
sional conduct.  The result is to impose contrasting mandates upon foreign 
attorneys regarding the same representation, while remaining at odds with 
corporate governance schemes in other nations that do not subscribe to cor-
porate structures based on individual responsibility, but embrace collegial 
schemes with shared corporate responsibility.  
To determine whether he qualifies based on one of the exemptions or 
whether he falls squarely under the provision of the rules, the foreign attor-
ney has to wade through a maze of legal definitions peculiar to American 
law and with which the foreign practitioner is not likely to be familiar.  The 
same is true with regard to the determination of which particular conduct 
triggers the applicability of up-the-ladder reporting. The logical course of 
action is to rely on the support of the American bar, which increases trans-
action costs for the issuer while not necessarily exempting the foreign law-
yer from responsibility under SOX in all cases.  
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Unfortunately, uncertainty of application in overlapping regulatory 
frameworks has only been increased by SOX under the guise of promoting 
transparency and certainty.  The SEC may have recognized that new, con-
troversial, and resisted norms of uncertain effectiveness and untested appli-
cation are particularly unfit to be exported wholesale. Appropriately, the 
refinement of applicability provided by the SEC final rules tones down the 
extent of federal imposition on the domestic bar regarding its accountability 
as “corporate watchdog.” Even more appropriately, in respect of the territo-
riality principle and of general rules of unnecessary conflict avoidance and 
comity, the SEC final rules have also introduced safe harbor provisions 
specifically to exempt the foreign bar to a large extent.  However, possible 
areas of applicability of the up-the-ladder reporting duties and its draconian 
consequences cannot be underestimated by foreign attorneys who become 
involved in representing foreign issuers registered with the SEC.  The for-
eign bar is well advised to be cautious.  
Likewise, in applying these controversial rules to the foreign bar, the 
SEC should take a restrained approach. The SEC should allow the rules’ 
persuasive force to bring about responses and solutions from foreign coun-
tries and the foreign bar, adapted to their own corporate regulatory systems. 
This way, the rules might achieve the common goal of cooperation in pre-
venting and curbing gross corporate malfeasance which compromises the 
stability of the global market.   
